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When asymmetric cryptography techniques are used in wireless networks, the public
keys of the nodes need to be widely available and signed by a Certificate Authority (CA).
However, the existence of a single CA in large wireless networks such as mobile ad hoc
networks and wireless sensor networks can lead the hotspot problem and become a security
weakness. In this work, we propose a distributed technique to cache the public keys on
regular nodes. Due to the limited memory size that each node is allowed to dedicate
for key caching, only some keys can be cached. In our proposed technique, each node
caches the public keys of a mix of local and remote nodes. The local nodes are defined as
the nodes within the same neighborhood according to the transmission range, while the
remote nodes are the ones outside the range. Access to the public keys of other nodes is
possible based on a chain of trust. Multiple copies of public keys from different chains of
trusted nodes provide fault tolerance. We explain our technique in detail and investigate
its salient features in this work. An interesting observation is the need to balance caching
public keys of local nodes and remote nodes. We studied the optimum local/remote public
key caching ratios for different networks via investigating the availability of the number
of required public key copies. These simulation results showed that by balancing the
caching public keys with the optimum ratios, the availability of the required public keys
kept increasing and finally became stable. We also did the simulation about studying the
number of hops to find the first copies of required public keys. The results showed how
local/remote ratios affected the minimum number of hops for reaching the first copies.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
I.1 Security Issues in Large Wireless Networks
I.1.1 Large Wireless Networks
With the wide use of wireless devices, large wireless networks are expected to play an in-
creasingly important role to provide networked information. An Examples of large wireless
networks is wireless sensor networks (WSNs). WSNs are composed by a large number of
sensors which can communicate with each other and monitor environmental conditions
cooperatively, such as sound, light, pressure and temperature. In such networks, each
node plays the same role and supports multi-hop routing. Since large number of sensor
nodes are densely deployed in WSNs, neighbor nodes may be close to each other [2]. Thus,
multihop communication is exploited in this kind of network in order to gain less power
consumption.
Sensor nodes are usually distributed randomly in the field to form a wireless sensor
network in an ad hoc manner for fulfilling certain task [7]. It is known that the idea of
ad hoc networking has around for over 30 years [11]. In this kind of network, usually
There are no preexisting infrastructures such as specific servers, while there are possibly
some power control nodes. Since no access points or routers exist, each node in the
network participates in routing and communicates with each other directly with multi-
hop routing. One example of such application is the battlefield surveillance. After being
randomly deployed in a battlefield, the sensor nodes need to be self-organized and form an
ad hoc wireless network. Each sensor node then collects the condition information around
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itself and sends the report observation messages to a central node via its neighbors. With
the information collected from different member nodes, the activities in the battlefield
can be deteted. This will help the control center to make appropriate and quick decision
when attack happens.
With more and more information delivered on these wireless networks, security be-
comes a critical issue. Many traditional protocols and algorithms will not work with ad
hoc networking. Security service such as authentications and key managment are essen-
tial for ensuring the normal oprations in hostile environments [7]. Authentication is the
basis of secure communication [9]. It can only been realized as verifying something which
is associated with an identity. Key management can be defined as a set of techniques
and procedures that support the establishment and maintenance of keying relationships
between authorized parties [8]. These services should adhere to the a number of security
attributes including key availability. The high-availability feature prevents degradation
of key managment services and ensure keying material is provided to nodes who expect
this material [9].
I.1.2 Asymmetric Key Scheme
The asymmetric cryptography scheme can be used to provide information security. Using
the asymmetric key scheme, each node in the network has a pair of keys: public key
and private key. The public keys should be known by all nodes in the network; the
private key should only be held by the node itself. For information confidentiality, a
node uses the public key (of a receiver) to encrypt the message. This encrypted message
can only be decrypted by the intended receiver who holds the matching private key. For
information authentication, a node uses its own private key to sign the message. In order
to authenticate the message, the receiver needs the public key of the sender.
However, the availability of these public keys can be an issue in large wireless networks.
Usually, there is a Certificate Authority (CA) that will issue certificates for every node.
Each certificate, signed by the CA, contains a public key and the identifier of a node. In
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large wireless networks, the existence of such a CA can become a security weakness. For
example, since the CA is known to the entire network, the adversary can attack it with
all its resources. The traffic toward the CA can be mis-routed with the use of worm-hole
attacks [5] or black-hole attacks [3]. Jamming attacks can be launched by the adversary
to blackout all wireless communications in the CA’s neighborhood.
I.2 Distributed Public Key Caching Scheme
In this work, we investigate a wireless network where every node can serve as a CA,
or a Peer CA (PCA). Since the certificate from one PCA can be unreliable (imagine a
compromised node serving as a PCA), the certificates from a number of PCAs will confirm
that the public key of a certain node is valid. This is similar to threshold cryptography [17]
and distributed trust [1].
Since every node in the network serves as a PCA, how the keys are stored becomes an
essential issue. On one extreme end, we let each node only store the public key of itself.
This results in a really key availability as there is only one public key for any specific node.
In any some node are compromised, there is no way for other nodes to realize the existence
of these compromises. On the other end, we let each node store the public keys of all the
other nodes. In this way, there is no need to worry about the key availability. However, it is
ineffecient to do so since we need to consider the source constraints of the nodes. Wireless
devices are usually resource-constrained, in terms of computational power, battery energy,
and on-board memory space. For example, the prototype sensors in WSNs have about
4K bytes of memory, which needs to support several important tasks: data collection and
on-board processing; system parameter storage; and key storage. Meanwhile, a public key
is usually as large as 128 bytes. The limited memory space that can be dedicated to key
storage gives rise to the following problem: how should the keys be cached and updated
in such large wireless networks?
In this work, we propose a distributed key caching scheme. In this scheme, each node
caches the public keys of some other nodes in the network. We investigate our public key
3
caching scheme through the availability of the public key copies and observe the existence
of an optimal local/remote ratio in different network scenarios. We also design a key
update strategy that will allow nodes to update their public key caches according to the
optimum local/remote ratio.
I.3 Related Work
Our work is mostly related to distributed trust establishment and security protection. In
this section, we discuss several related work in the following.
In [14] and [15], mobile certificate authorities (MOCAs) were established for hetero-
geneous mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) where some nodes are more reliable and
resourceful than others. These MOCAs share the responsibility of collectively providing
the CA functionality for the network, using threshold cryptography [17]. In the MOCA
certification Protocol (MP), a client requiring certificate service broadcasts a Certificate
Request (CREQ) message and waits for responses from at least k out of the n MOCAs.
With such k responses, the certificate can be fully reconstructed and the certification
process succeeds.
Similarly, in [10], a fully distributed trust model for MANET was introduced based
on trust graph and threshold cryptography. In their model, users can issue public key
certificates and authentication can be performed via certificate chains. To alleviate the
adverse effect of malicious nodes in the network, threshold cryptography was used. Thus,
a user needs to acquire k partial certificates for authentication.
In [6], a decentralized key management architecture was designed for WSNs. This ar-
chitecture supports key deployment, key refreshment, and key establishment. Symmetric
cryptography was used in the keying protocols in [6].
In the fully self-organized public-key management system presented by [4], all the users
in a MANET can generate their own public/private key pairs. The users can also store,
distribute, and revoke their public keys by themselves. Each node maintains a certificate
repository using two ways: by communicating with its certificate graph neighbors; and
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by applying a repository construction algorithm through a chain of trust [1, 12].
In [16], a composite key management scheme was designed to combine the public key
infrastructure (PKI) technique and self-organized certificate chaining technique. The PKI
usually uses threshold cryptography to adapt the ad hoc networks. The need with scheme
is the virtual certificate authority (CA), which is comprised of multiple nodes. The virtual
CA approaches require no warm-up period but impose higher maintenance overhead. The
self-organized certificate chain fits ad hoc networking but needs a warm-up period. The
work combined these two techniques by applying virtual CAs and certificate chain at the
same time.
In [13], the key management (SEKM) scheme was introduced for mobile ad hoc net-
works. The scheme uses an number of server groups while each of them creates a view of
the certificate authority (CA). The CAs provide certificate updating service for the nodes.
The server nodes form an special group for communication providing the underlying ser-
vice.
Our work differs from these related work in the sense that we focus on the use of
limited memory space to cache the public keys of different nodes. We further design a
public key search technique and a cache update algorithm to achieve optimum caching
ratio of public keys from local/remote nodes.
I.4 Document Organization
The paper is divided into five chapters followed by the references and the appendix.
• Chapter I introduces the backgroud for our distributed key caching scheme and
describes recent related works.
• Chapter II explains the public key caching scheme in detail.
• Chapter III shows the simulations results to evaluate our scheme.
• Chapter IV summarizes our work and discuss future works.
• Appendix A provides the code of the simulations.
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CHAPTER II
PUBLIC KEY CACHING SCHEME
We first introduce our notations and variables
• PUi: public key of node i;
• PRi: private key of node i;
• {pt}PRi: message pt signed by PRi;
• cm: crypted message;
• Ci: set of nodes whose public keys are cached in node i;
• Ni: set of physical neighbors of node i;
• R: list of nodes that involve in the sequence of KREQ message transmission;
• m: total number of public keys that each node caches;
• ǫ: extensive (ǫ = 1) or simple (ǫ = 0) search;
• γ: ratio of the numbers of keys for local/remote nodes cached by one node;
• TTL: the maximum number of hops a KREQ message may travel.
II.1 Operational Details of the Proposed Scheme
Assume that every node carries the public keys of some other nodes. Such information
can be obtained through pre-deployment key caching or through cache update, which will
be discussed later.
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Source (S) Destination (Q) TTL
Source (S) Destination (Q)
KREQ Message Format
KREP Message Format
{PUQ}PRi
List of Routers (R)
List of Routers (R)
Figure II.1: Message format of the KREQ and the KREP packets.
We first define two control messages that will be sent between nodes for public keys.
These messages are called Key REQuest (KREQ) message and Key REPly (KREP) mes-
sage. The KREQ message will be transmitted from the node requesting the public key of
another node. The format of KREQ message is shown in Fig. II.1. In this figure, Source
and Destination represent the node requesting the public key and the node’s identifier
whose public key is being requested; the list of routers (R) represents the nodes who have
been passing along the request.
The format of KREP message is similar (see Fig. II.1). The KREP message contains
the public key of the destination and this key is signed by the current router’s private key.
We explain the operational details of the KREQ and the KREP messages with an
example. Suppose node S needs to obtain node Q’s public key. It sends a KREQ =
{S, Q, TTL,R = Φ} to itself. Every node receiving a KREQ message should check
whether it has cached Q’s public key. If it does, it will sign the public key of Q with
its own private key, store the result onto a KREP message, and return to the previous
sender. Otherwise, it will attach its own ID to the list of routers, R, and forwards it to
each of the neighbors whose public keys are cached on its memory. The processing of
KREP message is simple: a node receiving a KREP message should first authenticate the
message, using the public key of the last sender. Then Q’s public key will be signed by
this node’s private key and sent to the previous node according to R.
There is a parameter ǫ, which controls whether a node caching Q’s public key should
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still forward the KREQ message. When ǫ = 1, our scheme operates with extensive search.
All nodes will forward the KREQ message. When ǫ = 0, our scheme operates with simple
search: only those nodes without Q’s public key in their cache will forward the KREQ
message.
The details of the above operations are presented in Algorithm 1. Nodes receiving
KREP messages should proceed according to Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to Process KREQ Message
1: Node i receives a KREQ message={S, Q, TTL,R}
2: d← last node ID in R
3: R ← {R; i}
4: if Q ∈ Ci then
5: Prepare KREP message as {S, Q, {PUQ}PRi,R}
6: Node i sends KREP to node d
7: if ǫ = 0 then
8: exit
9: end if
10: end if
11: TTL← TTL− 1
12: if TTL > 0 then
13: Prepare KREQ message as {S, Q, TTL,R}
14: for each j ∈ Ci ∩ Ni do
15: Node i sends KREQ message to node j
16: end for
17: end if
Algorithm 2 Algorithm to Process KREP Message
1: Node i receives a KREP message={S, Q, cm,R}
2: if i ≡ S then
3: d← first node ID in R
4: Node i computes PUQ = {cm}PUd, where d ∈ Ci
5: else
6: s← next node ID in R after i
7: d← previous node ID in R ahead of i
8: m← {cm}PUs
9: Prepare KREP message as {S, Q, {m}PRi,R}
10: Node i sends KREP message to node d
11: end if
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II.2 Cache Update
Each node can update its cache when it receives or overhears a public key for another
node through secured exchanges (such as the KREP message). We categorize the public
keys that are cached on each node into two groups: local and remote, which represent
the public keys of the local nodes that are direct neighbors of the node itself and remote
nodes, respectively.
We assume that each node will be preloaded with the public keys of m randomly
chosen nodes in the network. Therefore, the ratio of local/remote public keys may not be
the specified value γ. As more and more KREQ/KREP exchanges take place, nodes can
perform a cache update procedure as follows:
If the current local/remote public key ratio in cache is lower than γ and the public key
of a local node is received, the public key will be used to replace one of the remote public
keys. Similarly, if the current local/remote public key ratio in cache is higher than γ and
the public key of a remote node is received, the public key will be used to replace one of
the local public keys.1 Different methods can be used to choose the key to be replaced,
such as last-in-first-out, first-in-first-out, and most rarely used. In this work, we choose a
random selection method among the keys in the same category.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm to Update Cache
1: Node i receives/overhears the public key of node j, PUj
2: if j ∈/ Ci then
3: γcur ← |Ci ∪ Ni|/m
4: if γcur < γ and j ∈ Ni then
5: Update cache by replacing a randomly selected key that belongs to remote
nodes with PUj
6: end if
7: if γcur > γ and j ∈/ Ni then
8: Update cache by replacing a randomly selected key that belongs to local nodes
with PUj
9: end if
10: end if
1Care needs to be taken to avoid an oscillation effect, in which the key cache is frequently updated
with the local/remote ratio fluctuating slightly above and below γ. We leave this to our future work.
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This cache update algorithm is described in detail in Algorithm 3. We will investigate
the effect of such cache updates in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER III
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Our simulations were performed in Matlab. We believe that the use of other simulators,
such as ns2 or OPNET, are unnecessary because we are focusing on high-level public key
caching and cache update process in our evaluation. Unless specified otherwise, these
are the simulation setups: N = 200 nodes are randomly distributed in a network of size
1000 meters by 1000 meters. The radio transmission range is assumed to be 150 meters.
Initially each node carries the public keys of a random set (size m) of the nodes in the
network. Then we randomly select some source/destination pairs throughout the network.
In each of the source/destination pairs, the source needs to request for the public key of
the destination.
In our performance evaluation, we first focused on finding the number of public key
copies (K) for the destination node that are available for the source within a limited
number of hops. Another performance metric of our investigation was the optimum
local/remote key ratio, γ∗. We also studied the minimum number of hops (h) of reaching
the first public key copy for the destination node.
III.1 Available Copies
We investigate the availability of the public keys in this section. In this study, we assume
that every node has a γ mix of local/remote nodes’ public keys. Therefore, we focus on
the stable states of the node caches and we assume that key caches have been assigned
according to the local/remote ratio, γ. We run simulation for investigating the num-
11
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Local/remote key caching ratio, γ
N
um
be
r 
of
 p
ub
lic
 k
ey
 c
op
ie
s 
fo
un
d,
 K
 
 
TTL=2,  ε=1
TTL=3,  ε=1
TTL=2,  ε=0
TTL=3,  ε=0
Figure III.1: Comparison of extensive search and simple search when TTL = 2 and
TTL = 3 (m = 40).
ber of available required key copies with different parameter setting combinations. The
parameters we use are m, TTL and ǫ.
In Fig. III.1, we compare the public key availability of extensive search (ǫ = 1) and
simple search (ǫ = 0) with different TTL values. Naturally, the extensive search returned
a larger K because the KREQ message in extensive search can reach more nodes than
the simple search. The results in Fig. III.1 confirmed such an expectation. Furthermore,
as TTL increases, the value of K increases because the source nodes query larger regions.
Another interesting observation from Fig. III.1 is the convex shape of the curves: as γ
increases from 0 to 1, K increases with γ at the beginning and eventually decreases as γ
increases closer to 1. This can be explained as follows: when γ is close to 0, each node uses
its memory to cache mostly the public keys of remote nodes. The secure connectivity in
the source node’s neighborhood is limited (thus leading to small K), but increasing with
γ. On the other hand, when γ is closer to 1, each node uses its memory to cache mostly
the public keys of local nodes. The secure connectivity in the source node’s neighborhood
is good but these nodes are unlikely to have cached the public key of the destination node.
Therefore, lowering γ in this region should increase K. Overall, there is an optimum value
12
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Figure III.2: Comparison of different memory size m (TTL = 2, ǫ = 1).
for γ, which will be investigated in Fig. III.4.
Fig. III.2 shows the simulation results with different m when TTL = 2 and ǫ = 1. As
we can see from the figure, K increases with m. This can be explained by the increased
number of public keys cached on each node, increasing the chance of finding the public
key of the destination. An interesting observation is the K values at γ = 0 and γ = 1 for
different memory sizes. They remain approximately the same for different m. The reason
is that, when every node is caching only the public keys of local (remote) nodes only, the
availability of the key largely depends on whether the destination node is a local node.
As we can see in Fig. III.2, here are also maximum pionts for each curve, which means
that the corresponding optimum ratios ensure the highest key availability. It can be
noticed that the the optimum ratios are abviously different. The larger m is, the smaller
the optimum ratio is. The memory size m is an important factor that will decide what
the optimum ratio is for a network. We will explain this when investigating the optimum
values of γ in Fig. III.4.
Fig. III.3 presents the simulation results for TTL from 0 to 3. Similar to Fig. III.1,
K increases with TTL. The results for TTL = 0 were presented for comparison purposes
only; the source node should at least send the KREQ message to its 1-hop neighborhood.
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Figure III.3: Comparison of different TTL value TTL (m = 40, ǫ = 1).
When TTL = 0, it means that the source node will only search the required public key
in its own memory. There is only one chance for the source node to obtain the key. Thus
the local/remote caching ratio will not affect K much if TTL = 0.
As we have seen in the above figures, there are always maximum points on the curves.
This means that the local/remote ratio should be optimized to maximize the availability
of the public keys for the destination node. Such an optimum ratio, γ∗, is investigated in
Fig. III.4.
In Fig. III.4, we present the optimum ratios when we set different numbers for N . For
each N , the optimum ratio becomes smaller as the memory size m increases. With the help
from this figure, the optimum local/remote caching ratio can be set for a specific network.
For example, for a network with N = 200 and m = 50, the optimum local/remote caching
ratio γ∗ should be set to 0.27. Similarly, the optimum ratios are presented in Fig. III.4.
Also can be observed in Fig. III.4 and Fig. III.5, the value of γ∗ decreases almost
linearly with the increase of m. We conjecture that mγ∗ should be a constant for a
network of N nodes. For instance, when N = 200, mγ∗ is about 12-13. The product
of mγ∗ for a network of N = 400 is 20-22. These numbers are certainly related to the
density of the network, i.e., network region size and wireless transmission range. We leave
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Figure III.6: The minimum number of hops h to find the first public key copy with
different memory size m (TTL = 2, ǫ = 1).
further investigation as our future work.
III.2 Minimum Hop
From the above simulation results, we know that the local/remote key cahing ratio γ
affect the key availability within a certain number of hops. Moreover, an optimum ratio
exists for a specific network setting. Will γ work for resulting in different number of hops
to find the first copy of required public key? In this section, the minimum number of
hops for finding the first key copy is investigated. In this simulation, we also focus on the
stable states of the node caches, assuming that key caches have been assigned according
to the local/remote ratio, γ.
Fig. III.6 shows the how minimum number of hops changes with the increasing of the
key caching ratio γ. We can see that the average minimum hop count values shown in
different curves are around 1. This is a good news since it means that the first copy can
always be found within 1 hop, which is close to the source. There is no nice curve to show
that some optimum ratio can minimize the hop count. This is because all values in the
results are so close to each other that no big different can be shown.
16
III.3 Dynamic Systems
The previous observations tell us that there is an optimum ratio for ensuring the highest
key availability. How can we apply this optimum ratio to a simple network with corre-
sponding setting so that the key availability can be improved? In the further observation,
we run the simulation as the algorithm in section II.2.
In this section, we investigate the changes of K as a randomly loaded network of
nodes dynamically updating their key caches. According to the simulation result shown
in Fig. III.4, we chose γ∗ = 0.27 for a network with N = 200, m = 50, TTL = 2, and
ǫ = 1.
From the curves in Fig. III.7, we can see a clear upward trend of K as time goes on
with more and more KREQ/KREP being exchanged. The cache updates improved the
availability of required public key copies. After a certain number of cache updates, the
value of K stabilizes. The TTL value had a huge effect on the rate of increase for K. As
shown in Fig. III.7, a larger TTL allows K to reach stable (highest) value faster. This is
because, with larger TTL, more nodes have the chance to update their public key caches
in each KREQ/KREP message exchange. Thus, the local/remote caching ratios of the
nodes in the network approached the designed optimum ratio, γ∗, much faster.
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Figure III.7: Cache updates improved the availability of public key copies, K, (N = 200,
m = 50, ǫ = 1).
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
Asymmetric cryptography requires the knowledge of the public key from the other party.
These public keys are usually certified by a CA in many network systems. In large wireless
networks, such CAs may not exist. In this work, we have proposed to use the nodes to
serve as the peer CAs. A node requesting the public key of another node may obtain
multiple copies from chain of trust. In order to achieve this goal, we have designed a
scheme to allow nodes using their limited memory space to cache some of the public keys
that they have securely obtained. We have also designed a public key search technique
through secure multi-hop paths.
In the investigation of our scheme, we have observed that there exists an optimum
caching ratio for the public keys of local nodes and remote nodes. On the one hand,
if a node uses all its memory to cache the public keys of local nodes, the hop count
of finding enough copies of the public key for a remote node is significantly large. On
the other hand, if a node uses all its memory to cache the public keys of remote nodes,
a key request may have to travel multiple hops before finding a public key copy. An
optimum ratio of the public keys of local nodes and remote nodes should balance these
two requirements, allowing the key request to find enough copies within a reasonably
small hop count.
In our future work, we will implement our designed schemes under more realistic
network environments. In our work, the nodes are evenly distributed in the network.
However, a real network has more complicated topologies with the node joining and
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leaving. For example, within a non-uniform network, there are usually several clusters
with diffrent dense of the nodes. In this kind of network, it is uncertain that whether we
can find a optimum local/remote key caching ratio for each node. Diffrent local/remote
caching ratios may be assigned to the nodes in different clusters. Also, we will compare
its computation and security performance with other state-of-the-art techniques. With
the existence of malicious nodes in the network, public key copies may not agree with
each other. Trust levels can be maintained and used to select among these copies.
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APPENDIX A
SIMULATION CODE
A.1 Simulation Setup
A.1.1 Network
forwarding = 1;
TTL = 2; % set the value of TTL
N = 200; % number of nodes
R = 150; % tansmition range
X = 1000 ∗ rand(1, N); % randomly distribute the 200 nodes
Y = 1000 ∗ rand(1, N);
%−−−−−−−− the neighbor matrix −−−−−−−−−
NB = zeros(N);
fori = 1 : N
forj = 1 : N
NB(i, j) = ((X(j)−X(i))2 + (Y (j)− Y (i))2) <= R2;
end
NB(i, i) = 0;
end
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A.1.2 Key Distribution
key = zeros(N, m);
fori = 1 : N
nc = find(NB(i, :) == 1); % find the neighbors for node i
dc = find(NB(i, :) == 0); % find the distant nodes for node i
if(length(nc) <= m1) % assign the neighbor keys
key(i, 1 : length(nc)) = nc;
else
index nc = randperm(length(nc));
nc ind = index nc(1 : m1);
key(i, 1 : m1) = nc(nc ind);
end
if(length(dc) <= m2) % assign the distant keys
key(i, m1 + 1 : m) = dc;
else
index dc = randperm(length(dc));
dc ind = index dc(1 : m2);
key(i, m1 + 1 : m) = dc(dc ind);
end
end
%–convert the key matrix to a N*N matrix
N key = zeros(N);
fori1 = 1 : N
nz key = nonzeros(key(i1, :));
N key(i1, nz key) = 1;
end
%−− Calculate the trust connection matrix NB.N key
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TC = zeros(N);
TC = NB.∗N key;
A.2 Available Copies
fori4 = 0 : TTL
next n = [];
hits sub = 0;
forcur n = cur nodes
% does cur n carry public key of dn?
if N key (cur n, dn) == 1
hits sub = hits sub + 1;
end
% if forwarding or cur n doesn’t carry the public key % of dn
if(( N key (cur n, dn) == 0) |(forwarding))
cur nbs = find(TC(cur n, :). ∗ (visited == 0));
next n = [next n, cur nbs];
end
end %for cur n = cur nodes
hits(i4 + 1) = hits(i4 + 1) + hits sub;
cur nodes = unique(next n);
visited(cur nodes) = 1; % mark the nodes in R
end %for i4
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